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SYMPOSIUM: THE NATIONAL COMMISSION
FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND
PROCEDURES
A CRITICAL PROFILE OF THE NATIONAL ANTITRUST
COMMISSION
JOE Sims*

Historical Background
Popular preoccupation with national economic issues frequently leads
to vigorous debate in political and academic circles concerning the effectiveness of the antitrust laws. There are those who believe we need more
strenuous and innovative antitrust enforcement, and there are those who
think we already have too much, most of which is undirected.
These views are difficult to reconcile. To the first group, the antitrust
statutes are too weak and too timidly enforced. Large corporate enterprises
have acquired a dangerous degree of market power and a concomitant
measure of political power. To restore the discipline of the market, this
group would argue that we need stronger and more pervasive antitrust
regulation of the economy.
The second group contends that current antitrust enforcement more
often prevents, rather than furthers, the efficient functioning of our market
economy and, as a result, imposes very substantial (though unrecognized)
costs on society. Antitrust laws, this group believes, are too inflexible and
do not take account of the realities of economic structure and performance
in what has become a world marketplace. According to the second perspective, what we need is more centralized direction and control of antitrust
enforcement, and legislative correction of the overly-rigid language and
harsh judicial interpretations of existing antitrust laws.
One would expect that both groups would agree on the desirability of
* Jones, Day, Reavis &Pogue, Washington, D.C. During the formation of NCRALP, the
author was a Deputy Asst. Attorney General in the Antitrust Division.
Portions of this article contain material from two prior articles on the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures. Sims, Report of the President's Commission on Antitrust, REGULATION (March/April, 1979), at 25; Sims, National Review Commission Complete: Final Report Issues, 2 ABA ANThusT SECTION 1 (1979).
The author expresses his gratitude to Timothy J. Finn of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue,
for his assistance in the preparation of this article.
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a full reexamination of antitrust laws and enforcement patterns by a national study group. But in fact, only those who sought to limit antitrust
enforcement have called for study commissions and reviews; the antitrust
expansionists generally have opposed such notions. These attitudes generally reflected the political perceptions of both groups. The expansionists
have not been confident of their ability to control such a commission and,
at least as importantly, they have had unique political leverage through
the Senate Judiciary Committee's Antitrust Subcommittee.
Until 1976, the Antitrust Subcommittee was headed by Senator Philip
Hart (D. Mich.), a longtime antitrust activist and champion of expansionist antitrust reform. Senator Hart was always receptive to new ideas and,
as a result, antitrust expansionists flocked to his subcommittee. He held
innumerable hearings on such dramatic and innovative concepts as his
massive Industrial Concentration Act and no-fault monopoly. These hearings attracted much interest in the antitrust legal and economic community, some interest in the Washington media, and little interest elsewhere.
In the meantime, those who sought to limit antitrust enforcement efforts saw more hope through a broad approach, and continued to push for
a thorough review of antitrust laws and enforcement. A variety of politicians and business groups, as well as those parts of the government most
responsive to business interests kept up a regular drumbeat of criticism
and suggestions for review. Especially during the early part of the 1970's,
this effort continually seemed on the brink of success.
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice found itself caught
in the middle with conflicting instincts on the general subject of antitrust
reform. Like all bureaucracies, the Antitrust Division had some who would
have been pleased with an expansion of their authority, regardless of the
merits of that change. But unlike most other bureaucracies, this view was
definitely a minority one. The majority of those in policy positions in the
Division over the past two decades have been professional antitrust lawyers, from whose perspective the extremes of either position always had
seemed unattractive.
Those calling for more expansive antitrust enforcement were frequently, in the eyes of Antitrust Division professionals, either misinformed
or attempting to misuse antitrust enforcement to reach other political
goals. On the other hand, those who sought to limit traditional enforcement were seen as protecting narrow business interests. Neither group was
happy with the Antitrust Division, and the Division was anxious to maintain its independence from both. Thus, the Division consistently opposed
calls for antitrust study commissions, and, at the same time, was extremely selective in its support of the various legislative proposals set forth
by the Hart Subcommittee.
In early 1977, with the coming to power of the Carter Administration
and the retirement (and subsequent death) of Senator Hart, the stage was
set for a shift in momentum in favor of an antitrust study commission. For
reasons not altogether clear, Attorney General Bell very quickly became
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an advocate of an antitrust study commission. There is no indication that
he was adopting the rationale of other study commission supporters; indeed, the existing evidence of his motivation indicates the contrary. As
judged by his public statements, Bell came into office with serious concerns about three antitrust issues: "'big case" problems, shared monopolies, and agricultural cooperatives.'
Bell spoke repeatedly about "big case" problems: how they were too
long, too complicated for court proceedings, .how there was too much work
on both sides not directed toward a speedy resolution. 2 Bell's worst fears
were certainly confirmed at the Justice Department by the IBM" and
AT&T cases, two goliaths that, at the time, showed no signs of moving
ahead at flank speed. His exposure to these monster cases produced his
controversial suggestion that big antitrust cases should be tried before
Congress instead of a court - a suggestion Bell has since described as
merely an effort to get attention focused on the problem.'
Shared monopoly was also a constant topic of concern, although even
Bell had trouble defining the term. Like pornography, however, he was
sure the Antitrust Division could tell it when it saw it, if only the Division
would look for it. Bell was going to make sure the Antitrust Division did
look for it, by instigating and prosecuting shared monopoly cases instead
of spending all its time on small .merger or price fixing cases. His third
major concern -

the anticompetitive impact of regulation -

was fully

consistent with Antitrust Division efforts over the previous decade, and his
support merely insured the continuation of those efforts. Bell apparently
felt that at least some of these concems could be usefully addressed by a
study commission.
At this same time, Senator Edward Kennedy (D. Mass.) had just
gained the Antitrust Subcommittee chair, and set out to put his considerable energy and charisma to work in advancing the expansionist antitrust
viewpoint. Certainly, Kennedy intended to make the Antitrust Subcommittee a center of political and intellectual activity. Continued inflation
and energy problems appeared to have spawned nationally an extraordinary mixture of anti-big business and anti-big government passion which gave the Subcommittee unprecedented political visibility. Thus, it
is not surprising that Kennedy reacted negatively to the idea of an antitrust study commission. He already had the equivalent of such a commis' See, e.g., Address by Attorney General Bell before the Harvard Law Review (March
19, 1977), 806 ANTrrUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) F-1 (March 22, 1977).
2 See, e.g., 839 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-10 (Nov. 17, 1977) (reporting
Bell's address to the Litigation Section of the American Bar Association on discovery reform
and class action problems).
3 United States v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 69 Civ. 200 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 17,
1969).
'United States v. American Tel. & Tel., Civ. No. 74-1698 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 20, 1974).
See 811 ANTTRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-8 (April 28, 1977) (report of Bell's
initial proposal); 830 ANTrrausT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-21-22 (Sept. 19,1977) (reporting
Bell's subsequent characterization of his proposal).
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sion - the Antitrust Subcommittee - and his commission could hold
hearings, subpoena witnesses and, most importantly, pass laws. All a study
commission could do was study and recommend, said Kennedy, and its
recommendations would likely end up with those of most other such groups
on a shelf gathering dust.
Despite the reluctance of both the Antitrust Division and Kennedy,
Bell grew even fonder of the notion of a study commission, and at his
direction the Division began to draw up plans. It is no secret that some in
the Division saw this effort as a damage-limiting exercise. There continued
to be a substantial body of opinion within the Division that no change in
the antitrust laws was required and a continued fear that the results of
such a commission would more likely be harmful than helpful. Thus, in
planning what became the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures (NCRALP, Commission or National Commission) the Division sought to insure against adverse consequences by influencing both the membership and the agenda of the Commission. The
Division recommended people it thought qualified and sympathetic, some
of whom were selected. All in all, the non-political members were a professional, highly qualified group, but clearly tilted toward plaintiff and prosecutorial perspectives.
The Division also, by and large, sought to limit the agenda to purely
procedural matters and regulatory reform issues, and to avoid inquiry into
substantive rules of antitrust law. When it finally became clear that there
was going to be a study commission despite his views on the matter, however, Senator Kennedy and the FTC began pushing for a broader agenda,
including exploration of substantive issues, such as shared monopoly, nofault monopoly and attempts to monopolize. Moreover, Attorney General
Bell had his own notions of substantive matters worthy of attention.
The result, in the Executive Order creating the Commission and defming its mission, was a mandate to consider, generally "substantive rules of
law needed to expedite the resolution of complex antitrust issues" and,
specifically, the legal standard in government attempt to monopolize cases
and "non-judicial alternatives for resolution of complex antitrust cases." '
But all substantive inquiry was subject to the general caveat that the
Commission study was confined to "the framework of existing antitrust
laws (as that term is defined in 15.U.S.C. § 12 (1976))."1 Not accidentally,
the definition does not include the FTC Act.
The other substantive area suggested for study was regulatory reform.
In contrast to the antitrust laws themselves, the Antitrust Division viewed
regulatory reform as an area where the political winds were favorable, and
the downside risks small. Of course, this was an antitrust commission, not
a regulatory reform commission, and an antitrust handle was needed. Antitrust exemptions were the obvious answer. Since most regulated industries
Exec. Order No. 12,022, 3 C.F.R. 155 (1977).
Id. at 156.
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also enjoyed antitrust exemptions, economic regulation and antitrust exemption were nearly synonymous. A study of antitrust exemptions was
favored by all involved, and was easily included.
There was only one more hurdle to overcome. The original Executive
Order provided for three members from both the Senate and the House.
The House was no problem, but a glitch quickly appeared in the Senate.
Kennedy was obviously going to be one of the three, and another Democrat
would be named, but the Republican proved more difficult. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina was the ranking Republican on both the full
Judiciary Committee and the Antitrust Subcommittee, but Jacob Javits
of New York had been pushing for an antitrust study commission for years.
After fruitless negotiations, inquiries were made, the problem explained
and on April 7, 1978, more than four months after the initial Executive
Order was signed, a new order was issued expanding the size of the commission from 15 to 22 members.8 Both the Senate and the House were given
two more slots, a state Attorney General slot was added to recognize the
relatively new interest at that level of government, and the private sector
slots were increased from five to seven to insure that the additional congressional appointments did not unduly tip the balance of membership.
Senator Thurmond and Senator Javits both were appointed to the panel
(although shortly thereafter, Thurmond resigned and was replaced by
Orrin Hatch of Utah). The Commission's members were named by President Carter on June 21, 1978,1 and ordered to report back to him in seven
months.
The Results
On January 22, 1979, NCRALP produced its report to the President on time.'" For this accomplishment alone (which may be unparalleled), the
Exec. Order No. 12,052, 3 C.F.R. 173 (1978).
John H. Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, was
appointed Chairman of the Commission. The Commission included ten member of Congress:
Senator Edward M. Kennedy, then Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly and now Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee; Senator Jacob J. Javits;
Senator Howard M. Metzenbaum (now Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust
and Monopoly); Senator Robert Morgan; Senator Orrin G. Hatch; Congressman Peter W.
Rodino, Chairman of-the House Committee on the Judiciary and its Monopolies and Commercial Law Subcommittee; Congresswoman Barbara C. Jordan; Congressman Robert
McClory; Congressman John F. Seiberling; and Congressman Charles E. Wiggins. Two repre-sentatives of regulatory agencies, Michael A. Pertschuk, Chairman of the Federal Trade
Commission, and Alfred.E. Kahn, then Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board and now
Chairman of the Council on Wage-Price Stability, were named. The Commission also included C. Clyde Atkins, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida and Chauncey H. Browning, Jr., Attorney General of West Virginia. The
private sector members were practicing attorneys Maxwell M. Blecher, John Izard, James
M. Nicholson, Craig Spangenberg, and Gordon B. Spivak, and professors of law Eleanor M.
Fox and Lawrence A. Sullivan. See id.
MNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTrTRUST LAws AND PRocEDURES, ]REPORT To
THE P
mrNT AN Tim AvrORNEY GNERAL (Jan. 22, 1979) [hereinafter cited as CoMMIssioN
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members and staff deserve much credit. That the report is readable and
generally useful is a welcome bonus. For those who approached it as a
damage-limiting exercise, the effort was largely successful. Those who
hoped for support for antitrust expansionism got a few kind words, and can
justifiably claim credit for some progress. Only those who would prefer
limitations on current antitrust policies were shut out, and that result was
fairly predictable in view of the composition of the Commission.
The Commission's work was divided into three main areas. First, the
Commission studied procedure, and made a variety of recommendations
designed to eliminate or lessen the incidence of protraction in antitrust
litigation. Second, the Commission dealt with several questions of substantive law and remedies. In this area, the Commission's recommendations were considerably more controversial, and included endorsement of
a more expansive standard for preliminary injunctions, a recommendation
that the Sherman Act be amended to expand the scope of the attempt to
monopolize language in section 2, and a recommendation that Congress
study "no-fault" monopolization legislation. Finally, the Commission
added its voice to the current chorus of attacks on antitrust exemptions
and, more generally, economic regulation, broadly endorsing a review of all
significant exemption areas and repeal or substantial cut-backs of exemptions in surface transportation, insurance, agriculture, ocean shipping and
export trade. In addition, the Commission endorsed legislation to require
increased consideration of competitive issues in regulatory decisionmaking, along the lines of the Competition Improvements Act" introduced
by Senator Kennedy.
1. Procedural Issues
In the procedural area, the Commission's specific recommendations fall
into four areas: time limits, discovery reforms, sanctions against delaying
litigants, and various expedited adjudication devices. In all these areas,
the Commission emphasized close judicial control as the truly effective
solution to the particular problem."2 Most of the Commission's specific
recommendations are designed to place the court in a position of greater
active control over the litigation, particularly in the pretrial period, and
circumscribe the means by which counsel can effectively dictate the pace
of the proceeding.
For example, the Commission strongly endorsed time limits, starting
from the premise that "much of what lawyers do during litigation could
just as well be left undone." 3 From there, the Commission proceeds to the
reprinted in 897 ANTITRUST & TRmw REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) (Jan. 18,
1979).
" S. 2625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
12 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 18-26, 897 ANRrUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) (Special Supp.) at 5-8; see also Kingdon, The "Big Antitrust Case": Thoughts on
ProceduralReform, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 25 (1980).
"s COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 27, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
REPORT],
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notion that setting relatively tight time limits will encourage lawyers to
sort out those items actually necessary to the litgation from the universe
of possible issues."4 In order to maximize the impact of this recommendation, the Commission drafted and recommended the adoption of a Uniform
Local Rule of Court which would require an early pretrial order establishing a firm discovery schedule and a trial date within a reasonable period
(no later than two years after the date of the complaint "save where manifest injustice would result"). 15
The Commission also strongly urged discovery reform, citing with approval the efforts by the Judicial Conference, the ABA's Litigation Section, and the Second Circuit Commission on the Reduction of Burdens and
Costs in Civil Litigation to limit the scope of discovery. 6 Here too, the
Commission urged strong court involvement in the creation of discovery
plans: "Although the court should. . . avoid the imposition of a discovery
plan by fiat, uncooperative attitudes or unproductive proposals by the
litigants should not be accepted by the court.' 7 As a specific example, the
Commission recommends amendment of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to "clarify judicial authority to define issues unilaterally,
where litigants have failed to use reasonable efforts to agree." 8
With respect to the scope of discovery, the Commission would amend
Rule 26(b) to limit the scope of discovery to either the "issues raised" (the
standard proposed by the ABA) or "claims or defenses" (as suggested by
the Judicial Conference), rather than the "subject matter" of the action
as currently provided by the Rule. 9 The Commission urged greater use of
Rule 26(c), which authorizes courts to protect litigants from "annoyance,
embarrassment or undue burden or expense," and would amend the rule
to allow courts to deal with abuses on their own motion." On mechanics,
the Commission agreed with the Judicial Conference Committee, the ABA
Litigation Section, and the Second Circuit Commission that Rule 33 (governing written interrogatories to parties) 'and Rule 34 (governing the production of documents and things) should be revised to prevent the production of masses of unorganized and undesignated documents. The Commission strongly supported amendment of Rule 33(c), to require responding
parties to specify documents responsive to each interrogatory, and Rule 34,
(Special Supp.) at 8.
"Id. at 27-30, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 8-9.
Is Id. at 32-35, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 11.
"See A.B.A. LMGATION SECTION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY-OF
DISCOVERY ABUSE (Oct. 1977); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNrrED STATES COMMITrE

ON

RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 6-7 (March 1978); SECOND Cmcurr COMMISSION ON THE
REDUCTION OF BURDENS AND COSTS IN CIvIL LITIGATION, DRAFT REPORT (Sept. 18, 1978).
'" COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 44, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)

(Special Supp.) at 13.
"Id. at 63, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 19.
"Id. at 46, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 14.
20 Id. at 46-49, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 14-15.

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

8

[Vol. XXXVII

to require responsive documents to either be labeled corresponding to the
document request or produced as maintained in the ordinary course of
a
business.,
In its most focused discovery recommendation, the Commission followed the lead of Commissioner Fox in proposing a highly structured exchange of market-definition information.Y In cases where market definition is an issue, the Commission would require, within 20 days of the first
pretrial conference, that the plaintiff serve on the defendant its preliminary market definition contentions, and the defendant respond with its
contentions 30 days thereafter. After 30 more days, both would exchange
various market data, including the number and identity of competitors,
the particular products involved, and market shares. All principal documents utilized would have to be exchanged, and all persons relied upon
identified. According to the Commission, such an exchange would be
"likely to obviate much of the need for such discovery" on market issues,2
although the Commission would not preclude the parties from engaging in
further discovery on market definition or changing their initial market
definition contentions if the need arose. The judge, in the Commission's
plan, would retain the power to limit the markets considered to the number
"reasonably necessary" in the context of the particular litigation.
The Commission found that delay in complex litigation is often attributable simply to unreasonable and intentionally dilatory behavior by lawyers: "Lawyers, particularly in 'high-stakes' antitrust litigation, too often
file meritless defenses, or counterclaims, make excessive or abusive demands, unreasonably resist legitimate discovery requests, provide unresponsive 'stonewalling' answers and unreasonably produce masses of insignificant, nonresponsive information. 2 The Commission recommended
amendments to Rule 7(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to
make it clear that sanctions are authorized whenever a motion is submitted "primarily" for delay (as currently construed, only motions submitted
solely for delay are sanctioned).2 Similar changes were recommended to
28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976) to lower the level of wrongful intent required and
also to allow not only costs against attorneys who engaged in dilatory
behavior, but all expenses and attorneys' fees. 2' The Commission additionally advocated amendment of Rule 37, to authorize sanctions for delays
caused by excessive or abusive discovery requests and give the court authority to impose sanctions sua sponte.Y The Commission also stressed the
2!

Id. at 49, 897

ANTITRUST & TRADE REO. REP.

(BNA) (Special Supp.) at 15.

Id. at 65-66, 897 ANTIrRUST & TRADE REQ. Rsw. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 20.
" Id. at 66, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 20.
24 Id.
at 82, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 24.
21 Id. at 86, 897 ATTRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 25.
21 Id. at 86-88, 897 ANTTRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 25-26. 28
U.S.C. § 1927 (1976) now provides for the imposition of costs against an attorney who "so
multiplies the proceedings in any case as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously."

Id.
SCOMMISSION

REPORT,

supra note 10, at 86-87, 897 AwTITuST &TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
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need for revision of the ABA and state codes of professional responsibility
to redefine and emphasize the duty to refrain from dilatory conduct. The
Commission urged the bar associations to move beyond the existing "wellintentioned" but "uncomfortably general" ethical rules and define with
specificity unethical delaying practices.?
The Commission left little doubt that it believed the defense bar responsible for most of the professional malfeasance in antitrust litigation,
noting that defendants !'can garner considerable financial benefit by protracting litigation."29 A sharply divided Commission came down hard on
defense lawyers and their clients, recommending the award of prejudgment,
interest (interest from the date of service of the complaint rather than the
date of judgment) at prevailing commercial rates as a necessary incentive
to avoid delay." This issue was the most divisive in the entire Commission
Report. Nine members of the Commission dissented, including all but one
of the practicing lawyers.31 In fact, with the exception of Commissioners
Spangenberg and Sullivan, the only persons voting in favor of prejudgment
interest were government officials. Recognizing that their recommendation
on prejudgment inteiest would tend to strongly favor plaintiffs, the Commission sought to even the scales by urging that courts take the plaintiff's
litigation conduct into account in calculating its attorneys' fee awards3 2 but, obviously, many members of the Commission felt that the balance
had not quite been struck.
Finally, the Commission encouraged expanded application of various
procedural devices that can be used to avoid full trials altogether, such as
summary judgment, interlocutory appeal, separate trials on separable issues (such as liability and damages) and collateral estoppel. The Commission suggested nothing novel in its discussions of summary judgment, interlocutory appeal, or trial of separable issues, but emphasized that these
procedural devices can often be used in protracted litigation to focus issues
and facilitate settlement, even where they cannot be used to dispose of the
case completely." To encourage wider application of collateral estoppel in
antitrust litigation, the Commission recommended revision of section 5(a)
of the Clayton Act,u which provides that a final judgment entered against
(Special Supp.) at 26.
n Id. at 88, 897 ANTrRUST & TRADE RXG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 26-27.
n Id. at 90, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REo. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 27. See Fox,

Monopoly and Competition: Tilting the Law Towards a More Competitive Economy, 37
WASH. &LEE L. Rzv. 49, 50 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Fox].
" COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 10, at 89-91, 897 ANTrTRUST &TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 27-28.
11Id. at 91, 897 ANTITRUST &TRADE REG.REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 28. Commissioners Blecher, Fox, Izard, McClory, Nicholson, Spivack, Wiggins, Hatch, and Seiberling dissented from this recommendation. Id.

31Id. at 90, 897
13

ANTTRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 27-28.
Id. at 68-72, 105-06, 897 ANTITRUST &TRADE REo. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 21-

23, 31-32.
3 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1976).
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a defendant in a government case can be used as prima facie evidence
against the defendant in a subsequent litigation. Noting that some courts
have interpreted the statute to preclude a collateral estoppel (rather than
merely prima facie) effect," the Commission would amend the statute to
assure that it imposes no limitation on the offensive use of collateral estoppel in appropriate circumstances." The Commission recognized that this
modification -

like prejudgment interest - would increase pressure on

defendants to settle government cases in order to avoid subsequent estoppel, but concluded that this effect did not outweigh the potential benefits
of the rule.
Significantly, the Commission refrained from endorsing several innovative procedural proposals. Of the five specific procedural issues mentioned
in the original Executive Order,3" the Commission ultimately agreed with
only two - revision of discovery practices and increased sanctions. The
Commission rejected probably the most publicized proposal, a roster of
district court judges; 8 decided against revision of pleading requirements,
the case for which the Commission described as "very weak;"39 and concluded that no amendment of evidentiary rules was necessary. In addition,
the Commission made no recommendation on what has become a very
controversial issue in major antitrust litigation, the continued use of juries.
The Commission found the evidence about the effect of juries
"inconclusive" and that, furthermore, the constitutional right to jury trial
was beyond the Commission's mandate." The Commission did suggest
that where antitrust trials employ juries, courts make a greater effort to
render the proceedings comprehensible by, for instance, instructing the
jury periodically throughout the trial on the factual issues and relevant
legal principles and allowing the jury to take notes."2
2.

Substantive Issues

The Commission devoted two chapters of its report to substantive issues: relief in section 7 (Clayton Act) and section 2 (Sherman Act) cases
and new statutory standards for monopolization and attempt to monopolize cases. Both have strong procedural elements, and both were clearly
intended to favor plaintiffs and prosecutors. Both also have an air of academic abstraction. In fact, the relief chapter is little more than an intellecSee, e.g., Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 690 (1961) (dictum);
Purex Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 308 F. Supp. 584, 589-90 (C.D. Cal. 1970), affl'd, 453
F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1065 (1972).
"' COMMSSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 101-05, 897 ANTrTRUST &TRADER EG. REP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 29-31.
" Exec. Order No. 12,022, § 2(a)(1), 3 C.F.R. 155, 156 (1977).
arUS
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
3 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 20-22, 897 AN
(Special Supp.) at 7-8.
3' Id. at 75-76 n.14, 897 ANTTRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 19 n.14.
40Id. at 99-101, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 28-29.
"1 Id. at 106-07, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 32.
42 Id.
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tual complaint about the real world. The Commission quite accurately
complained that relief frequently has been ineffective in antitrust cases,
especially in structural cases, and assigned the blame to the failure of the
courts to utilize their power to fashion relief in a way that would most
promote competition. The courts, according to the Commission, have
paid entirely too much attention to what the Commission described as
"private" interests (those of the defendant and its employees, customers
and suppliers) and too little attention to what the Commission called the
"public" interest in competition." In the National Commission's view, the
courts inappropriately have attempted too often to balance these "private"
and "public" interests in drafting a balanced relief proposal. 5
The Commission envisioned two ways to solve the problem of ineffective relief: prevent the consummation of additional transactions pending
the outcome of litigation, thus rendering relief unnecessary in some cases;
and convince judges to be more aggressive on relief issues, especially in
section 2 cases.Thus, the Commission endorsed a greatly liberalized standard for the granting of preliminary injunctions. The National Commission favored granting a preliminary injunction where a probability of success on the merits is shown without any further investigation; even where
that showing cannot be made, the Commission still would grd.nt a preliminary injunction where "significant, substantial and difficult issues of law"
are raised and where the "balance of hardship" falls on the plaintiffs.46 But
as Commissioner Spivak, a former Director of Operations for the Antitrust
Division, pointed out, the current "probability of success on the merits"
standard requires only a showing that the plaintiff demonstrate by
"reliable probative evidence a reasonable probability of a reasonable prob7
ability of a substantial lessening of competition in a specific market."'
Where this relatively meager showing cannot be made, Spivak believes, a
restraint on the consummation of the merger (whether a preliminary injunction or hold separate order) would be a wholly unjustified governmental substitution of bureaucratic judgment for the operation of free markets.'"
Spivak has put his finger on an anomaly explainable only by the prosecutorial bias of the Commission. Of course, the Commission's standard
would include every government merger case, barring the possibility that
the government would challenge a merger that did not involve "significant,
substantial and different issues of law." Thus, the Commission's proposal
would have the same practical effect as the automatic statutory stay unId. at 115-19, 897
" Id. at 121-25, 897

ANTRUST & TAE REG. REP.
ANTrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP.

(BNA) (Special Supp.) at 32-34.
(BNA) (Special Supp.) at 35-36.

4' Id.

46Id. at 127, 897 ANITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 37.
,1 Id., at 138 n.43, 897 ANTITRUsT & TRADE Ro. RE. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 37 n.43.
" Id. Senator Javits expressed similar views on this issue. See Separate Views of ComUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at
missionerJavits, id. at 388-91, 897 AN
110-11.
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successfully sought in the original pre-merger provisions of the Hart-ScottRodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976,11 and later dropped from that
legislation before its passage. The proposal is also very similar to the standard propounded by the Antitrust Division in its recent unsuccessful attempt to enjoin the acquisition of Carrier Corporation by United Technologies.5" This proposal would give the enforcement agencies a virtual veto
power over mergers, since the issuance of a preliminary injunction would
effectively preclude the subsequent consumation of most mergers. Thus,
the practical effect of the Commission's proposal is to allow the regulatory
agencies broad authority over merger activity, which, absent an "abuse of
discretion," would be essentially free from judicial review. Unfortunately, NCRALP did not even consider those issues and, as a result, its
recommendation lacks credibility.
The National Commission also argued strongly that structural relief
should be the preferred remedy for violations of section 2 of the Sherman
Act or section 7 of the Clayton Act.5" In fact, the Commission sharply
criticizes courts for attempting to restore the status quo ante and for acceptance of partial divestiture as an adequate remedy. 2 The National
Commission believes that courts should fashion whatever remedy is desirable to obtain "workable competition", including (where necessary) divestiture of more than the "offending assets. 0' 3 The Commission's approach
would place the court in an actively "regulatory" position in constructing
equitable relief - contrary to the traditional judicial inclination to respond only to the particular adjudicated wrong and simply put things back
where they were before the violation.
The Commission argued, with some justification, that attempts to restore competition by less radical means, such as injunctions aimed at particular practices or divestiture only of the offending assets, often flounder.
Given these difficulties, NCRALP concluded that the public interest
would be better served by an effort to restructure the marketplace. 4 Here
again, the Commission's intellectual argument runs into the practical,
real-world fact that courts are always going to be reluctant to impose their
judgment of a proper market structure. 5 Even where a court subsequently
concludes that a particular acquisition violates section 7, and especially
where it concludes that a market structure developed over many years
violates section 2, courts will be reluctant to intervene in the activist manner urged by NCRALP. The effects on shareholders, employees, and cusSee H.R. 8532, 13489, 14580; S. 1284, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
See United States v. United Tech., [1979-2] TRADE CAs. (CCH) § 62,393 (N.D.N.Y.
TRADE CAS. (CCH) § 62,405 (2d Cir. 1978).
" COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 114-21, 897 ANTRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 33-34.
11Id. at 119-23, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 34-35.
50

1978), aff'd [1979-2]

53 Id.

Id. at 114-20, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 33-34.
See, e.g. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 347-48 (D.
Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiem, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).

1980]

CRITICAL PROFILE

tomers, "private" interests though they may be, will always concern a
district court judge, and properly so. Moreover, the initiation of a section
2 or section 7 lawsuit does not transform a federal district court into the
Federal Trade Commission or an Industrial Reorganization Court. It remains a court of law, and its role is to adjudicate a particular issue between
particular parties. While the case for wide-ranging structural relief has
intellectual appeal, at least from a regulatory perspective, the proposal is
not likely to influence the actions of very many district judges.
Perhaps in recognition of the great difficultiies in this area, the Commission urged the creation of a task force, including representatives of the
Antitrust Division, the Federal Trade Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Internal Revenue Service and the Federal Judicial Center, to develop a manual for divestiture. The manual would include
information about various divestiture methods, examples of cases, various
tools for measuring impact, analysis of the use of masters and other technical experts, various tax provisions and other guidelines and suggestions for
increasing the effectiveness of relief once a violation has been found.
Only two substantive liability standards received any real attention by
the Commission. The first issue, the attempt to monopolize standards, was
mandated by the Executive Order itself, 7 and to absolutely no one's surprise, the Commission found the state of the law in the attempt area to be
confusing and inconsistent." While it would be hard to find anyone who
would disagree with that conclusion, resolution of the problem is a subject
on which reasonable men could differ forever. Despite this lack of consensus and strong opposition by the ABA Antitrust Section and others, the
Commission nevertheless decided to recommend an amendment to section
2 of the Sherman Act.
The Commission found too restrictive the prevailing view that a section
2 attempt case requires a showing of a dangerous probability of success in
achieving monopoly, under which near-monopoly market share is often a
prerequisite. 9 The Commission's amendment to section 2 of the Sherman
Act would provide that conduct which "significantly threatens competition in any relevant market" constitutes a "dangerous risk of monopoly."
The threat to competition would be evaluated under the amendment by
weighing the defendant's intent, its present or probable market power, and
the anticompetitive potential of the conduct at issue."0 In addition, the
1, Commission Report, supra note 10, at 132-34, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 39-40.
"7See Exec. Order No. 12,022, 3 C.F.R. 155 (1977).
53COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 143-45, 897 ANTiRUST &TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 41.
,Id. at 145-46, 897 ANTITRUST &TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 42.

"Id. at 141-51, 897 ANTrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 42-44. The
Commission's proviso would state that:
[I]n determining whether a person has attempted to monopolize a part of trade
or commerce, (1) a dangerous risk of monopoly shall be held to exist upon a showing

that the conduct alleged to constitute the attempt significantly threatens competi-
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Commission's proviso would prevent the Areeda-Turner predatory pricing
test (defining as predatory only prices that were below average variable or
marginal cost) from being used as a definitive or controlling consideration
in an attempt to monopolize case."1
The Commission was obviously concerned that the combination of a
strict reading of the dangerous probability requirement and the simplicity
and logic of the Areeda-Turner formulation was preventing full utilization
of the attempt to monopolize provision. In fact, some members of
NCRALP and the Commission staff favored a separate statutory prohibition of unilateral anticompetitive conduct, although there was no agreement on either language or standards. 2 The final recommendation was
designed simply to make the attempt proviso more useable.
Although the Commission described the continued viability of the dangerous probability standard as "more a matter of precedent than wellreasoned antitrust analysis,"" there is no doubt that both this analysis and
the Areeda-Turner formulation's popularity with the courts are due in
significant part to the fear that a relaxation of these standards would result
in a significant increase in litigation attacking aggressive competition and
that the summary procedures now available to discourage such attacks
would no longer be effective."' The Commission, however, did not recognize
or discuss this problem, nor did it discuss the solution suggested by the
Executive Order itself, i.e., changing the standard for government cases
only. Such a change seems the logical answer to these competing concerns,
and it is strange that the Commission chose to ignore it. Allowing the
government greater latitude in dealing with unilateral anticompetitive
conduct would go a long way toward invigorating the attempt provision
without raising any realistic fears about chilling legitimate commercial
behavior. The Commission's failure to even discuss this option is a disaption in any relevant market, as determined after an evaluation of the defendant's

intent, the defendant's present or probable market power, and the anticompetitive
potential of the conduct undertaken; and (2) the fact that a defendant's prices were
not below either average variable cost or marginal cost shall not be controlling, but
may properly be considered, in assessing the defendant's intent and the conduct
at issue.
Id. at 165-66, 897 ANTrTRUST &TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 50.
,1 Id. at 149-51, 897 ANTIrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 44.
92 See Separate Views of Commissioner Blecher, COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at
333-39, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 95-96; Separate Views
of Commissioner Sullivan, id. at 413-14, 897 ANTTRrUST & TRADE REo. REP. (BNA) (Special
Supp.) at 117.
0 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 145-47, 897 ANTrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 42.
" See Separate Views of Commissioner Hatch, COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at
353-53, 897 ANTrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 101; PartialConcurrence
of Senator EdwardM. Kennedy and Senator Robert Morgan, COMMISSION REPORT, supranote
10, at 355-56; 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 101-02; Separate
Views of Commissioner Javits, COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 391-92, 897 ANTrrRUST
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) a 111-12.
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pointing exception to the general quality of the analysis in its -report.
Possibly the single most controversial subject the Commission dealt
with was the so-called "no-fault" monopolization proposal set forth by the
Federal Trade Commission and others.6 4 ' The proposals varied, but generally would have permitted government suits for structural relief where
monopoly power had persisted over some undefined number of years. Tlhe
proposals would eliminate any requirement that "bad" conduct be shown
to have assisted in the creation or maintenance ofthis monopoly power,
and mandate divestiture for a violation in the absence of a showing that
divestiture would eliminate scale or other efficiencies.
The Commission staff originally tried to discourage a detailed inquiry
into "no-fault" proposals, on the ground that the Executive Order did not
contemplate substantive changes in the antitrust laws. The proponents of
"no-fault" responded that their proposals were indeed relevant to the
Commission's inquiry because they would expedite complex antitrust litigation. By eliminating the conduct requirement from antitrust litigation,
trials would be shorter and quicker. This position ultimately was abandoned by "no-fault" proponents after it became clear that conduct evidence of various kinds would almost surely be relevant and admissable in
either the liability or the relief stage of a "no-fault" proceeding, and thus
it is doubtful that time would be saved.
Indeed, there were strong arguments that the proposed new statute
would require longer and more complicated proceedings, since all proposals mandated at least some inquiry into the existence of scale efficiencies,
an inquiry not necessarily relevant under today's law. 5 The scale efficiencies of an organization and the losses that would result from divestiture
cannot thoroughly be assessed without an investigation which would include but not be limited to, past conduct. Unable to demonstrate persuasively the litigation economies in "no-fault" monopoly, its proponents
and the Commission ultimately rested their jurisdictional case on the likelihood of improving relief by enabling the government to concentrate and
focus on the "real problem" of market structure and encouraging judges,
once a violation was found, to enforce structural relief wherever possible.
As the Commission Report outlines, NCRALP eventually divided into
three camps of relatively equal size: (1) one group favored the "no-fault"
legislation; (2) another group favored exhortations to the courts to presume
that persistent monopoly power is caused by culpable conduct, and thus
shift the burden of proof to the contrary toward the defendant; (3) a third
group would not revise the traditional proof requirements, arguing that
current substantive standards are not the cause of significant protraction
1".,
See Dougherty, Kirkwood & Hurwitz, Elimination of the Conduct Requirement in
Government Monopolization Cases, 37 WASH. & LEE Rv.83 (1980); Fox, supra note 29, at
53-62.
"See Separate Views of CommissionerHatch, COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, 35764, 897 ANTrrRuST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 102-03; McKinney, The Case
Against No-Conduct Monopolization, 37 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 73 (1980).
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and that a change would be positively harmful."
The Commission thus could not reach a consensus position, even
though the Commission Report describes the option of new legislation as
"the logical solution to the several problems that today afflict monopolization litigation." 7 The Commission, in the end, recommended congressional study of the issues and the various proposed solutions, with particular emphasis on the kinds of efficiency defenses that should be permitted,
the proper role of market definition in such cases, and the likely number
of industries which vould be affected by various alternative proposals. 8
The proponents of "no-fault" accomplished all they could reasonably
hope for in getting a Presidential Commission to support, however tentatively, their efforts for legislation. Details and caveats tend to be washed
away by the tides of time, and in the long run the Commission's support
may well be seen as the first step toward legislation.
3.

Exemptions and Immunities

On the immunities front, NCRALP joined the long and growing line of
official and semiofficial organizations that have criticized both specific
statutory exemption and the implied immunities that frequently result
from economic regdlation. It should shock no one that the Commission
concluded that competition is good and antitrust immunities are generally
bad. Nor is it surprising the Commission concluded that, even when immunities are absolutely necessary, they should be limited to those necessary to accomplish the statutory purpose. Of the particular immunities
studied, NCRALP quite predictably concluded they should all either be
repealed or substantially cut back.'
Economic deregulation is one matter on which both the antitrust
"liberals" (favoring expanded enforcement) and the antitrust
"conservatives" (interested in relaxing antitrust enforcement) can agree.
The liberal camp rightly views the antitrust immunities as means of protecting unjustified corporate profits from the rigors of the market. The
conservative group bases its opposition to certain antitrust rules as well as
antitrust immunities on the common ground that a market economy
should be left free from regulatory restraints. Accordingly, the Commission
was nearly unanimous in its conclusions in this area.
Of course, the Commission, with its limited resources and time, could
not study in detail all antitrust exemptions. Instead, it focused on those
immunities and exemptions where data were most easily available and
where the Commission saw some hope of change. In so doing, the Commission followed very closely in the footsteps of the Task Group on Antitrust
"1 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 155-62, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 47-49.
' Id. at 155-58, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 47.
,Id. at 160-63, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. RaP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 49.

See id. at 177-95, 897

ANTITRUST

& TRADE

REG.

REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 50-56.
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Immunities created by President Ford, which produced a comprehensive
set of reports in January of 1977 generally reviewing antitrust immunities.
In fact, the Antitrust Commission concentrated on many of the same major
exemptions as the Task Group - surface transportation, insurance, agriculture, ocean shipping, and export associations (the Webb-Pomerene exemption). Of course, the Commission staff, composed largely of Antitrust
Division personnel, obviously had some influence on the choice of areas to
focus on, but the more powerful influence was the recognition by Commission members that the Commission, if it was to be effective and influential,
needed to concentrate on those areas where data were readily available.
The portion of the Commission's Report dealing with immunities and
exemptions is about half of its total report, and includes historical background and analysis of each of the exemption areas studied. Given space
considerations, I can only summarize the Commission's conclusions in
each of the areas studied.
The Commission spent more time on the surface transportation exemptions than any other issue and focused almost all its attention on trucking.
This was a logical development, for several reasons. First, this area was an
area of hot activity at the time the Commission was created: Senator
Kennedy was holding hearings; the ICC was chaiging some important
regulatory principles; and the Carter Administration, basking in the thrill
of victory with airline deregulation legislation, was looking at trucks as a
second course. Second, the empirical and analytical work in this area
dwarfs that in most of the other exemption areas. Fiially, the Commission
felt that, for both of these reasons, the chances of significant reform in this
area were the greatest.
Its conclusions, after all this effort, were simple and stark: economic
regulation of the trucking industry should be ended, and the ReedBulwinkle antitrust immunity for joint rate-setting should be repealed."
The Commission waffled slightly on railroad deregulation, but clearly had
the same general feelings about the railroad industry.7 ' Interestingly, it
made no distinction between railroads and trucks with respect to repeal
of the Reed-Bulwinkle Act.
The insurance industry caused NCRALP as much trouble as any. A
number of Commissioners had considerable prior background in the area,
and there was no common starting point. In addition, the inquiry into
insurance regulation seemed to be inextricably tied to non-economic issues, such as discrimination and availability. Thus, the Commission struggled mightily with insurance, but in the end, it bit the bullet. The Commission concluded that there was simply no justification for the continued
complete antitrust exemption of the insurance industry, and recommended repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson antitrust exemption.72
To replace McCarran-Ferguson, the Commission made two recommen70 Id.

REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 56.

at 177-80, 897

ANTITRUST

&TRADE

n Id. at 211-16, 897
72Id. at 214-16, 897

ANTrrRUST
ANTrrRUST

& TADwE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 63-64.
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 64.
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dations. First, it suggested the adoption of a statute affirming "the lawfulness of a limited number of essential collective activities.""3 According to
the Commission, these activities might include pooling and joint calculation of past loss data and perhaps trending of that data, but probably
would not include the preparation of the administrative expense component of insurance rates and certainly would not include the joint setting
of any rates.7" Secondly, the Commission recommended more study on the
regulatory problems of insurance, and "the appropriate mix, if any, of state
and federal regulation."75 The Commission urged that its first recommendation, repeal of McCarran-Ferguson and its replacement with a much
more limited statute, should not await the completion of the more complicated and comprehensive study recommended in its second recommendation."6
There was remarkably little controversy within NCRALP on the argriculture exemption. It was generally accepted quite early that a comprehensive exemption for agriculture cooperatives was not desirable, and the
Commission spent the remainder of its time on trying to arrive at a formulation for change. The final conclusion, with only one dissent, 77 was that
only the formation of agriculture cooperatives should be completely exempted from antitrust scrutiny. Actions following the formation, including
mergers and marketing agreements, should be tested under the antitrust
laws.
The Commission obviously was faced with a study in analytical inconsistency: cooperatives are formed to do things that are ordinarily illegal
under the anitrust laws. Once we allow their formation, how can we logically prevent .them from doing what they were formed to do? After much
debate, the Commission settled on what it viewed as a middle ground:
action of a cooperative after its formation would be tested by Clayton Act
merger standards, and not the arguably harder Sherman Act criteria ordinarily applicable to agreements among competitors. s Thus, price fixing
arrangements, marketing agencies in common, "super coop" arrangements, or other cooperative activities would not be per se illegal but instead would be prohibited only when their effect may be substantially to
lessen competition. This "incipency" test would presumably permit more
conduct of this type by small cooperatives, and less by those with dominant market shares. The recommendation obviously looks better as a policy judgment than a litigation standard.
Though these standards would govern mergers of cooperatives,
NCRALP believed thai the acquisition of market power through internal
Id. at 226-28, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
7, Id. at 216, 234-43, 897 ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG.
75 Id. at 242-43, 897 ANTTRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
7, Id. at 242-45, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.

(BNA) (Special Supp.) at 65.
REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 72.

(BNA) (Special Supp.) at 72.
(BNA) (Special Supp.) at 72-73.
" See id. at 270 n.30, 897 ANTIrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 76
n.29a (noting Commissioner Izard's opposition to amendment or repeal of the CapperVolstead Act).
11Id. at 259-63, 897 ANTrrRUST & TRADE REo. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 76-77.

19801

CRITICAL PROFILE

growth should still be controlled by administrative regulation. The Commission recommended that Congress amend the-current section 2 of the
Capper-Volstead Act,7" which allows the Secretary of Agriculture to control
cooperative conduct leading to "undue enhancement" of prices, to clarify
its meaning."0 The National Commission also recommended that Congress
separate enforcement responsibility for the provision from responsibility
for promotion of agricultural cooperatives, possibly by removing enforcement from the Department of Agriculture." Finally, the Commission suggested that the Secretary of Agriculture take competitive factors into account in making decisions under the agricultural, marketing order pro82

gram.

Considering the ocean shipping exemption, the Commission could
reach no consensus and recommended additional study." This recommendation was heavily influenced by the Carter Administration's creation of
an interagency study of ocean shipping regulatory policy. In part, however,
there was a feeling on the part of many Commissioners that they simply
did not have enough information to reach a final decision. Nevertheless,
NCRALP did agree, with only one dissent,"' that some features of the
current regulatory system were unnecessarily anticompetitive and should
be abolished. Specifically, the Commission recommended that no antitrust
immunity be granted to shipping conferences that did not permit independent action by their members or engaged in dual rate contracts, rate agreements with independent lines, or pooling agreements among conferences.,
The international comity and defense considerations that so concerned the
Commission as a general matter in this industry were obviously not sufficient to convince the Commission that-these particularly anticompetitive
devices were necessary.
The Commission rejected the recommendation of its Business Advisory
Panel and urged the Congress to consider whether the Webb-Pomerene
exemption for export associations should continue. 6 In addition, the Commission recommended that, if the exemption was retained, it should be

limitea to those situations where a clear showing of need can be made. The
Commission saw no reason to distinguish between services and the export
of goods, and recommended that any continued exemption be applicable
to either."
"

7 U.S.C. § 292 (1976).

N

Id. at 261-63, 897 ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 77.

$Id.
Id. at 261-66, 897 ANTIRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 77-79.
at 265-66, 897 ANTIRruST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 79.

3Id.

" See id. at 293 n.53, 897

ANTITRUST

& TRADE

REG.

REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 85

n.52 (noting the dissent of Commissioner Spivak).
ANTITRUST 68 & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 85.
See McDermid, The Antitrust Commission and the Webb-Pomerene Act: A Critical
Assessment, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 105 (1980).
"CoMIssION REPORT, supranote 10, at 300-04, 897 AmTIRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 88-89.

Id. at 285-88, 897

"
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The Business Advisory Panel, which grew out of an interagency export
policy task force chaired by the Department of Commerce, had strongly
supported the continued existence of the exemption and argued that in fact
it was necessary to promote American exports." The Commission was not
convinced, but the panel's conclusion probably prevented a vote to repeal
the exemption.
Finally, the Commission took up what seems to have become almost a
perennial subject of debate in and around the Congress, the so-called Competition Improvements Act. 9 This Kennedy legislation is an attempt to
short-circuit the lengthy individual regulatory reform process by requiring
agencies making decisions which have competitive impacts to take those
effects into consideration, evaluate their necessity, compare the competitive cost with the regulatory benefits, and where possible, limit the competitive costs. The Commission strongly endorsed legislation along these
lines. In fact, until the last-minute objections by congressional members
who complained that endorsement of a specific bill would cause them
embarrassment, NCRALP was prepared to endorse S. 2625 itself. In the
end, the National Commission merely recommended the specific language
of the bill, without citing the bill's title or number.
Legislative Results
Thus far, the practical impact of the Commission has been minimal.
The Commission's Report was influential in producing parts of the omnibus antitrust procedural bill in the Senate - the "Antitrust Procedural
Improvements Act of 1979"11 - and three counterpart bills in the House.2
These bills adopt the Commission's recommendations to amend the Clayton Act to allow government judgments to be given collateral estoppel
rather than merely primafacie effect in subsequent private litigation,93 and
to authorize the award of prejudgment interest from the date of the complaint. 4 The bills also would amend 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976) to allow courts
" The Panel's conclusions are contained in Volume 2 of the Commission Report.
COMMISSION REPORT,

supra note 10, vol. 2 at 291.

soS. 2625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). The Competition Improvements Act of 1978 is
an amended version of the Competition Improvements Act of 1976, S. 2028, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1976). A recently introduced regulatory reform bill, S. 2147, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979), contains a provision which is similar in intent, but more limited in its scope and
impact than the previous Competition Improvement Act bills. Section 642 of S. 2147 requires
a finding for certain agency actions affecting competition that "the policy or rule is the least
anticompetitive alternative legally and practically available to the agency to achieve its
statutory goals."
0 COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 10, at 307-16, 897 ANTRrusT &TRADE REG.REP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 89-92.
" Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1979, S. 390, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (1979).
Passed by the Senate on July 20, 1979.
32 H.R. 4046, 4047, 4048, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (1979).
1 S. 390 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1979); H.R. 4046, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (1979). See
text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
" S. 390, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. § 5 (1979); H.R. 4048, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (1979). See
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to impose personal liability on the offending attorney for costs, expenses
and attorneys' fees incurred because of attorney conduct engaged in
"unreasonably and primarily for the purpose of delaying or increasing the
cost of the litigation." 5
The substantive recommendations of greatest concern to the Commission - the no-fault monopoly concept and attempt to monopolize standards - have, however, generated absolutely no legislative interest. This
is due only in part to their questionable merit; more importantly, the
political climate has taken some unexpected turns.
The most surprising political turn has been the weakness of Senator
Kennedy as Judiciary Committee chairman. Many observers thought Kennedy would be a powerful activist in this position. This concern increased
the enthusiasm in some quarters for NCRALP, since it would tend to
dccupy the attention of the antitrust activists for a while and have the
effect of diverting Kennedy's antitrust resources. Whether the Commission
has been a major contributor or not is problematical, but Kennedy has
certainly been slowed down.
Kennedy has introduced a number of antitrust proposals, but absolutely none have moved anywhere. His top priority, overturning the Illinois
Brick decision, has barely kept its head above water, and it faces a most
uncertain legislative future." His conglomerate merger legislation'7 has
died a quiet death, and he has been forced to fall back to a more limited
proposal to limit acquisitions by major oil companies.,' Even that is unlikely to pass, despite the political boost given by the Exxon-Reliance
merger and the decision of the Carter Administration and the Antitrust
Division to support Kennedy's efforts.9 In short, Kennedy has so far been
unable to deliver at anywhere near the rate that some hoped (and others
feared) and is far from addressing the more complex problems of no-fault
or attempted monopoly.
The Commission's recommendations with respect to antitrust immunities have likewise had little effect to date. In fact, the President, following
the counsel of the recently concluded Interagency Task Force on Maritime
Regulation, has announced his support for legislation that totally ignores
the Commission's recommendations. The President recommended legislation to facilitate the grant of antitrust immunity to shipping conferences
by the Federal Maritime Commission and authorize the FMC to extend
text accompanying notes 29-31 supra.
"1 S. 390, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. § 4 (1979); H.R. 4047, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (1979). See
text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
" The Antitrust Enforcement Act of 1979, S.300, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), popularly
known as the Illinois Brick bill, has been approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee but
has not been submitted for a vote of the Senate for fear of filibuster. See 926 ANTrrRusT &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-7 (Aug. 9, 1979).
,1Small and Independent Business Protection Act of 1979, S.600, 96th Cong. 1st Sess.
(1979).
" Oil Windfall Acquisition Act of 1979, S. 1246, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (1979).
"See 937 ANTIRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-27 (Nov. 1, 1979).
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antitrust immunity to "shippers councils," which are organizations of
users of ocean shipping.4.°0 The National Commission's work might deserve
some minor credit for the trucking deregulation legislation introduced by
Senator Kennedy'' soon after the Commission's Report. The argument
against the antitrust immunities in the trucking area, however, was clear
and convincing to all except those with financial or political interests in
the present scheme of regulation long before the Commission's Report.
Thus, Senator Kennedy's original view now appears to have been quite
prescient. So far, the Commission's Report has indeed not had significant
political impact. Given continuing inflation, and the general support of
both the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission for substantive legislation, one normally would expect the opposite. Whether this
is due largely to better business lobbying, a growing understanding and
acceptance of the essentially economic character of antitrust enforcement;
or the general distrust of government is not clear. Whatever the reasons,
this Congress is obviously not prepared to become an antitrust activist.
Though some relatively technical legislation may pass, it seems unlikely
that anything major will come out of the current session. And next year is
a presidential election year, during which legislation generally plays second fiddle to presidential politics. Of course, as we saw in 1976 (with the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act), sometimes the two coincide. But moving complex
pieces of legislation through both houses of Congress in a presidential
election year is an extremely difficult task. The safest bet would probably
be on no new antitrust laws until after the election. .
That means that the NCRALP Report will likely be useful in the short
run only to academics, for purposes such as this symposium. That is not
necessarily bad - in fact, it might well be good. The National Commission
worked very quickly and covered a lot of ground, not all of it thoroughly.
A somewhat more careful analysis cannot hurt, especially in an area such
as antitrust, where reason is so often clouded by emotion and different
social values frequently dictate very different conclusions. Certainly in the
important substantive areas of the Commission's Report - no-fault monopoly and attempt to monopolize - a lot more work is needed before a
persuasive case can be built for the Commission's recommendations. Unless that is done (and I have serious doubts it can be), NCRALP's substantive recommendations are not likely to bear fruit.
It's still too early, therefore, to fully measure NCRALP's contribution.
All that is certain is that the Commission finished on time and generated
I Letter from President Carter to Senator Inouye (July 20, 1979). The amendments to
the Shipping Act introduced by Sen. Inouye, the Shipping Reform Act of 1979, S. 1463, 96th
Cong. 1st Sess. (1979), move well beyond the President's recommendations. This bill would
make agreements among water carriers, intermodal carriers or shippers councils
"presumptively, in the public interest" and would grant antitrust immunity for such agreements irrespective of whether they are approved by the FMC. Only the FMC would have
authority to penalize unauthorized agreements. Id.
" Motor Carrier Ratemaking Reform Act of 1979, S. 710, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (1979).
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considerable debate over its conclusions and recommendations. On that
basis alone, the National Commission must be considered successful. Only
time will tell whether NCRALP's conclusions can be described as influential.

